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Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications
Of Free Enterprise Fund
Harold J. Krent*
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board1 the Supreme
Court invalidated Congress’s decision to protect members of the Board from at will removal by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, whose members in turn are protected from at will
removal at the hands of the President.2 The case arose out of Congress’s establishment of the
Board as part of Sarbanes Oxley3 to regulate accounting methods and procedures for publicly
traded companies. Accounting firms must register with the Board and comply with its regulatory
standards.4 In addition, the PCAOB conducts inspections of registered accounting firms, both on
a regular basis and in response to allegations of noncompliance with its standards.5 Free
Enterprise Fund is the first decision in almost a century to prohibit Congress from cushioning an
executive branch official from removal, and the decision, as a consequence, will refuel debate
over the scope and nature of independent agencies.
In the Court’s view, the congressional structure – in particular, the double layer of tenure
insulation -- undermined the Article II imperative that all exercises of significant executive
authority be subject to strong supervision by the President. As the Court explained, “the
*
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130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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The Supreme Court so concluded on basis of the parties’ stipulation. Id. at 3148-49,

3

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.

4

15 U.S.C. § 1712-13.

3182.
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diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability . . . Without a clear effective chain
of command, the public cannot ‘determine on whom the blame or punishment of a pernicious
measure or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.’”6 Given the departure from clear
lines of authority, “the result is a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President
who is not responsible for the Board.”7 The dissenters questioned why removal should be
viewed as so central to the question of accountability under Article II, as opposed to other
supervisory tools, such as rulemaking, funding, and the like.8 The dissent expressed concern for
the fate of analogous agency structures, such as for administrative law judges who are also
shielded from at will dismissal9 that the majority decision placed in jeopardy.
Curiously, the dissenting opinion only tangentially considered the impact of the
majority’s decision on delegations outside the executive branch. The Court’s insistence in Free
Enterprise Fund on formal presidential control over an inferior executive branch entity should
cast grave doubt on the constitutionality of comparable congressional delegations to private
entities. Should Congress delegate to a private or state entity, no removal is likely possible, let
alone the removal for cause found insufficient in Free Exercise Fund. Had Congress delegated
the same financial oversight duties scrutinized in Free Exercise Fund to a commission comprised
of the heads of Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Ernst & Young, the President’s
removal authority would be further eroded, as would be the case if Congress had delegated that
authority to a commission of state secretaries of the treasury. The recent Supreme Court decision
5

15 U.S.C. § 7214.

6

Id. at 3155 (citing Federalist No. 70).

7

Id. at 3153.

8

Id. at 3179, Appendix A (Breyer, J., dissenting).

9

Id. at 3180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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therefore may toll congressional experimentation to vest executive authority in private and state
hands.
Ironically, Congress by its own terms created the PCAOB outside of the federal
government. Congress provided that members of the Board were not to be considered “officer[s]
. . . or agent[s of] the Federal Government.”10 Moreover, Congress determined that the Board
“shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.”11 Congress also
determined that the salary of Board members should be set in accordance with the private
market.12 Congress presumably wished to ensure that individuals with wide experience in public
accounting could be persuaded to participate in the regulatory initiative.13 Had the Court taken
Congress at its word, then its path in the Free Enterprise Fund case might have been much
simpler. It could have assessed whether Congress could have delegated the accounting and
inspection duties to an outside entity and thereby avoided its more controversial decision that the
double layer of tenure insulation violated Article II. The logic of the majority’s decision in the
case seemingly would have militated for invalidation on the ground that such significant
authority could not, consistent with Article II, be vested in a private entity.14 Indeed, much of

10

15 U.S.C. § 7211(b).

11

Id.

12

Id. § 7219(b)-(d).

13

See Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial
Regulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 485, 504-06 (2009).
14

Justice Roberts confusingly observed with respect to the removal provision that “[t]he
rigorous standard that must be met before a Board member may be removed was drawn from
statutes concerning private organizations like the New York Stock Exchange. . . While we need
not decide the question here, a removal standard appropriate for limiting Government control
over private bodies may be inappropriate for officers wielding the executive power of the United
States.” 130 S. Ct. at 3158. The relevant question rather should be whether the individual is
exercising significant authority under the laws of the United States.
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the early controversy surrounding creation of the PCAOB focused on whether a private entity
could discharge the regulatory role that Congress in fact assigned to the Board.15 The Court
dismissed that line of inquiry in part because it accepted the parties’ stipulations that the Board,
despite Congress’s labeling to the contrary, should be considered a public entity and in part
because of prior precedents rejecting congressional labeling at face value.16
The Obama administration has seemed willing to share power with both private and state
entities. Congress, with the President’s acquiescence, has proposed that a private entity – the
National Academy of Sciences – play a determinative role in setting global warming policy.17 In
addition, the administration agreed to a proposal creating a private Cybersecurity Advisory Panel
that could have vetoed the Department of Commerce’s contract with the Internet Company for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).18 Moreover, the health care reform bill included a
delegation to a state entity, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), to
determine medical loss ratio standards which, to some extent, are binding on the Department of
Health and Human Services.19 These initiatives have received scant attention.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund, therefore, provides renewed
reason to consider whether congressional delegations outside the federal government pose the
same threat to accountability as does delegation to the PCAOB. In Part I, I argue that the

15

See Donna M. Nagy, The SEC at 70: Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1000-03 (2005).
16

Id. at 3148. See Brief for the United States, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB at 29.n.8,
cited by the Court at 3148. The Court relied on Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,
513 U.S. 374 (1995), in stating that the congressional labeling was not dispositive.
17

Section 707 of Waxman Markey bill.

18

S. 773, 111th Cong., 1st Sess.§ 8 (2010).

19

Section 2718 of the Public Health Service Act (or 1001 of Patient Protection Act).
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reasoning in the recent Supreme Court decision should apply to delegations outside as well as
inside the federal government. I summarize reasons that I have previously presented for why
delegations to private parties should be cabined.20 Free Enterprise Fund, in my view, strongly
supports that view and suggests that the roles accorded to private entities in the Cybersecurity
and National Academy of Sciences examples would be unconstitutional, admittedly despite prior
Supreme Court precedents that seemingly countenance such delegations.
In Part II, however, I conclude that a similar delegation to a state entity should survive
the Free Enterprise Fund analysis. Although the same concern for executive branch control
exists, our structure of federalism presupposes that the federal government can share power with
the states. Even though lines of accountability can become blurred, as in the NAIC example,
accountability nonetheless can be attained through the political process in the respective states.
Moreover, the fear of congressional aggrandizement is much reduced when Congress delegates
to state as opposed to private entities. Accordingly, the essay concludes that Free Enterprise
Fund should bar delegations of significant authority to private individuals and groups but leave
untouched most congressional efforts to share power with state governmental entities.

I. Delegation Jurisprudence and Free Enterprise Fund
Congress at times has experimented by delegating a range of duties to private parties.
Indeed, presidents largely have acquiesced in such delegations. As with congressional creation
of the PCAOB, eliciting private party participation more directly can ensure greater expertise in
governing and provide political cover for potentially unpopular regulatory initiatives.

20

Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegation to Private
Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 901 (forthcoming 2011).
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A. Prior Judicial Precedents
Although most such efforts have gone unchallenged in the courts, courts have reviewed
challenges to a number of congressional schemes. The canonical case is Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.21 There, the Supreme Court considered a statutory scheme in which a majority of miners
and producers of two-thirds of the annual tonnage of coal established working conditions that
would bind the entire group. The maximum hours of work could be set, as well as the minimum
wage. The Court explained that “the effect, in respect to wages and hours, is to subject the
dissentient minority . . . to the will of the stated majority.”22 In other words, “[t]he power
conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling
minority.”23 The Court concluded that “[t]his is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form, for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested,
but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in
the same business.”24 To the Court, the private status of the decisionmakers rendered the
delegation more suspect.
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,25 as well, the Court questioned
Congress’s reliance on private parties to establish codes of fair competition under the National
Industrial Recovery Act. Under the Act, trade groups proposed codes of fair competition for
ultimate approval by the President. The Court struck down those sections of the NIRA on both

21

298 U.S. 238 (1936).

22

Id. at 311.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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nondelegation and Commerce Clause grounds.26
In so doing, the Court noted the sweeping power exercised by private entities, even
though the proposed codes were subject to presidential authorization. The Court asked, “would
it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or
industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise
and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade?”27 Although acknowledging
that Congress understandably might wish to delegate to private parties “because such
associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises,” the Court
emphatically stated that “[s]uch a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is
utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”28
No delegation to private parties after Carter Coal and Schechter, however, has been
invalidated. Courts subsequently have upheld powers delegated to producer groups under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 193729 and similar statutes.30 In Sunshine Anthracite

26

Other examples of delegation to private parties exist. Congressional delegations to
private parties have, on occasion, been more direct. In 1893, Congress delegated authority to the
American Railway Association to establish a mandatory height for drawbars on railroad cars, and
legislated that failure to comply with the height requirement subjected the railroad companies to
civil penalties. The Supreme Court upheld the delegation with little discussion. St. Louis Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285-87 (2008). Further, private parties have served
on governmental agencies such as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which operates
as part of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 263. The private members are elected
annually by the boards of directors of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are
privately owned. The FOMC as a whole discharges the critical policymaking function of
determining sales and purchases of government securities in the open market.
27

295 U.S. at 584.

28

Id.

29

7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.

30

See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq (beef); 7 U.S.C. § 2102 et seq. (cotton); 7 U.S.C. §
4501 et seq. (dairy products).
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Coal v. Adkins31 for example, the Supreme Court held that the advisory role private producers
played in recommending coal prices did not constitute an unlawful delegation of executive
power to private individuals because the private members “function[ed] subordinately to the
[public] Commission. It, not the [private producers], determines the prices.”32 Evidence that the
Commission rubberstamped the determinations made by private producers was not dispositive.33
In other words, the Court reasoned that private groups do not exercise problematic authority if
the executive branch holds the formal power to approve whatever is forwarded by the private
entity. Even though the private groups in effect make law, the required governmental approval
makes the delegation acceptable.34 The Supreme Court has reasoned, therefore, that no untoward
delegation of private authority exists if sufficient oversight can be exercised by federal
governmental officials.
The Supreme Court manifested an even more lenient approach in Schweiker v.
McClure.35 There, the Court considered a Due Process challenge to private adjudication under
the Medicare Part B program. Under the Part B Program, Congress authorized the Secretary to
contract with private insurance carriers to review and pay out deserving claims. Carrier

31

310 U.S. 381 (1940). See also Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d at 86-87); Chiglades Farm
v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Correctional Services Corp. v. Matesko, 534 U.S. 61,
74 (2001).
32

Id. at 399.

33

As Justice Cardozo stated in concurrence in Schechter, “[i]t is the imprimatur of the
President that begets the quality of law, not the plans forwarded for approval by the trade
groups.” 295 U.S. at 592.
34

United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939); H.P. Hood &
Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939) (designation
of tobacco growing areas); United State v. MacMullen, 262 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1958) (wheat
quotas); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989) (beef program).
35

456 U.S. 188 (1982).
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determinations are subject to a limited right to review by hearing officers who are also appointed
by the carrier.36 As a practical matter, the decision of the private hearing officer is conclusive.
The lower court invalidated the system of private adjudication, reasoning that due process
required additional procedural safeguards.37 Accordingly, it ordered de novo hearings before an
administrative judge of the Social Security Administration.38
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding that, as long as the Secretary directs the
carriers to appoint only “an attorney or other qualified individual with the ability to conduct
formal hearings and with a general understanding of medical matters and terminology,” no risk
of erroneous deprivation existed.39 The fact that the hearing officers were private did not create
any untoward risk of self-dealing, particularly because the funds used to satisfy the judgments
came from the United States Treasury as opposed to the carriers (and hearing officers)
themselves.
Taken together, Sunshine Anthracite and Schweiker v. McClure suggest a wide ambit for
the private exercise of delegated authority. Private parties can exercise authority, backed by the
coercive power of the state, as long as the authority is confined to a relatively narrow scope (as
in Sunshine Anthracite and Schweiker) or is subject to review by executive branch officials (as in
Sunshine Anthracite).
Lower courts have so construed those precedents, permitting delegations to private

36

Id. at 191 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.807-812 (1980)). See also Bowen v. Michigan
Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (sketching limited availability of judicial
review under Part B).
37

See 456 U.S. at 195.

38

See Id.

39

Id. at 199.
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entities for varied purposes. In Cospito v. Heckler,40 for instance, the question raised was
whether Congress could delegate to a private group, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH), the power to determine whether a hospital was eligible for Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursement.41 The private group assessed the quality of care at health care
institutions to determine eligibility for participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
One pertinent provision with respect to psychiatric hospitals provided that such hospitals could
be certified “if such distinct part meets requirements equivalent to such [JCAH] accreditation
requirements as determined by the Secretary.”42 The court of appeals held that the Secretary’s
power under the Acts to bypass determinations made by the JCAH salvaged the delegation.43
Accordingly, “[s]ince, in effect, all actions of JCAH are subject to full review by a public official
who is responsible and responsive to the political process, we find that there has been no real
delegation of authority to JCAH.”44 Judge Becker in dissent scoffed at the majority’s reasoning,
stating that the JCAH at the relevant time “might ‘define’ a ‘psychiatric hospital’ however it
chose, and might use whatever procedures it wished in developing that definition . . . and the
JCAH regulations were not subject to judicial or administrative review... The JCAH’s freedom
to apply its regulations to individual hospitals was also unfettered.”45 He concluded that “courts
should not permit Congress to delegate to private bodies, that are not required by statute to listen
40

742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984).

41

For other examples, see City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding
delegation to determine whether particular cable operators could access video systems); GeoTech Reclamation Indus. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding delegation to
communities in effect to veto landfill permits if sufficient opposition were voiced).
42

42 U.S.C. § 1395x(f).

43

742 F.2d at 88.

44

Id. at 89.
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to affected parties in making their regulations, and whose regulations are not subject to review
under the Administrative Procedure Act.”46
Similarly, in Todd & Co. v. SEC47 the court of appeals considered whether Congress’s
delegation of authority to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) constituted an
unconstitutional delegation to a private entity. The Maloney Act authorized the self-regulatory
entity to promulgate rules protecting against fraudulent and unethical practices, and to discipline
members who failed to conform to the standards promulgated.48 Congress authorized the SEC to
review the NASD’s findings upon appeal. A brokerage house contested a NASD investigation of
its activities on the ground that the Maloney Act constituted an undue delegation to a private
entity. The court rejected the challenge because the SEC retained the power “to approve or
disapprove the Association’s rules,” to make additional findings if necessary, and “make an
independent judgment on the violation and penalty.”49 Accordingly, the court found no
impermissible exercise of authority by the self-regulatory entity. Even when Congress
eliminated the SEC’s right to make additional findings to add to the record, the court in a
subsequent case similarly sustained the delegation to the self-regulatory entity.50 Much as in
Schweiker v. McClure, the Court was not concerned, from an Article II vantage point, with the
authority exercised by private decisionmakers.
Based on cases prior to Free Enterprise Fund, the proposed delegations to the National
45

Id. at 90.

46

Id. at 91.

47

557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).

48

Id. at 1012.

49

Id.

50

First Jersey Securities v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1979) (following Todd, even
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Academy of Sciences and the Cybersecurity Panel would likely be validated. In both cases, the
ambit of authority delegated is narrow – in one case concerning only attainment of particular
carbon emission standards and, in the other, the ICANN contract. Moreover, executive branch
officials must act in conjunction with the private parties in both cases before effecting national
policy, in the global warning setting the President must issue a presidential order to cut emissions
further and, with respect to cybersecurity, the Department of Commerce retains the power to recraft any subsequent ICANN contract. The private parties may shape or nudge executive branch
action, but their acts do not replace it. As the next part argues, however, Free Exercise Fund
destabilizes any such assumption.
B. Free Enterprise Fund and Article II.
The analysis in Free Enterprise Fund likely shifts the analysis. From the perspective of
the majority, delegations to private parties arguably threaten the Constitution by circumventing
the executive branch control that was designed to protect all individuals from governmental
overreaching. The President’s appointment and removal authorities are both implicated, for, as
discussed in Free Enterprise Fund, they provide the “key constitutional means” for the President
to retain control over authority delegated by Congress.51
1. The Appointment Authority
Although Free Enterprise Fund pinned its decision on the President’s removal authority
under Article II, an understanding of the Appointments Clause, from which the removal
authority is drawn, sets the stage.52 Under the Appointments Clause, presidents enjoy the power

though Congress had subsequently weakened SEC oversight of the NASD’s findings).
51

130 S. Ct. at 3157.

52

See also Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting Appointments Clause
issue that would arise from permitting federal government to delegate decisionmaking authority
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to appoint all superior officers of the United States. Through the appointment power, presidents
can ensure that only officers they approve of are enforcing the law. Article II provides that the
President must appoint all superior officers, and that Congress can decide whether to vest
appointment authority over inferior officers in the President, heads of departments, or courts of
law.53 There have been disagreements over linedrawing particularly between superior and
inferior officers,54 but consensus exists over the role that the Appointments Clause plays under
the Constitution. The President’s choice of officer influences the exercise of delegated
authority.55
In Buckley v. Valeo,56 the Court chose “significant authority” as a threshold for triggering
the Appointments Clause, and explained that the term encompassed “broad administrative
powers: rulemaking, advisory opinions, and eligibility for funds.”57 Although investigation and
information gathering did not rise to the significant authority level,58 all individuals exercising
more formal power to affect the rights of third parties must be considered officers of the United
States and subject to Article II limitations.59
In addition, all officers of the United States must take an oath of office to uphold the

to states over pollution attainment policy).
53

U.S.C. Const. Art. II § 2, cl. 2.

54

See Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,

671-72.
55

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-41; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 16364 (1926).
56

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

57

Id. at 140.

58

Id.

59

Individuals exercising authority that is only intermittent, however, may fall outside the
Buckley rule. See Krent, supra note .
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Constitution. That oath signifies a more profound obligation to the public trust than a mere
contractual duty. For serious malfeasance in office, officers can be impeached.60
Congressional delegations of authority to private parties – whether to a producer group,
single individual or National Academy of Sciences – bypass the presidential appointment
authority. If Congress vested significant authority in the Cybersecurity Panel, the resulting
execution of the law could not be as readily traced to the President, and his appointment
authority would be circumvented.61 As the Supreme Court stressed in Edmond v. United States62
“the Appointments Clause . . . is more than a matter of ‘etiquette or protocol’; it is among the
significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the
Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment.”63
Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress play no direct role in the
appointment of officers. In Buckley the Court considered a congressional measure empowering

60

The Obama Administration appointed Kenneth Feinberg, a New York attorney, to set
the compensation that executives of entities receiving TARP funds can earn. 74 Fed. Reg.
28394. The Administration, however, did not submit Feinberg’s name to the Senate for
confirmation. Thus, appointment of Feinberg can only comport with the Constitution if he is not
considered an “officer of the United States.” Given that Feinberg issued binding orders affecting
private rights, his status as an officer seems relatively clear and yet Congress did not provide for
his appointment – as an inferior officer – in the heads of any department. See Michael W.
McConnell, The Pay Czar is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2009, at Opinion.
61

For those embracing a theory of directory authority, the lack of presidential
appointment is not fatal. Rather, if the President can order state officials to take particular
positions or substitute state officials’ decisions for their own, or so the argument goes, then
fidelity to Article II is maintained. Not only do I challenge the existence of such directory
authority, see Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523
(2008), but the scepter of presidential bossing of state officials would almost surely violate the
federalism principles built into the Tenth Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes .
62

520 U.S. 651 (1997).

63

Id. at 660.
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the Speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate to appoint four members of
the newly created electoral commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.64
The Court held that Congress could neither participate in the appointment process directly nor
indirectly, and noted that the “debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist
Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the national
government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.”65 Respecting the
President’s appointment authority was critical to ensuring that Congress take no part in execution
of the law through appointment of officers. If Congress retained close supervision of the private
delegate, then Congress in essence would oversee execution of its own laws, a role that the
Supreme Court has held would conflict with the Constitution.66
Similarly, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise,67 the Court considered whether Congress, in establishing a compact to oversee
administration of D.C. area airports, could subject major decisions of that compact to a board of
review, consisting of nine members of Congress in their individual capacities as users of the
airports.68 The Court held that the board of review, through its veto power, exercised significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States and hence invalidated the continuing
congressional role on the Board.69 In the eyes of the Court, the Board was “a blueprint for

64

Id. at 11.

65

Id. at 128.

66

See infra text accompanying notes .

67

501 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1991).

68

Id.

69

Id. at 277.
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extensive expansion of the legislative power.”70 Congressional delegation of power to private
individuals outside the purview of the Appointments Clause cannot easily be reconciled with
Free Enterprise Fund.
At times, congressional delegation to private parties may permit the President to exercise
the appointment power. Consider Congress’s creation of the United States Railway Association
to monitor CONRAIL and issue bonds, among other duties.71 In so doing, Congress provided
that a majority of the entity’s members were to be drawn by the President from lists of private
individuals supplied by the AFL-CIO and Association of American Railroads.72 The vast
majority of congressional delegations, however, whether to producer groups or the National
Academy of Sciences, bypasses the President’s appointment power.
2. The Removal Authority
The Supreme Court also has recognized under Article II the President’s inherent right to
remove any executive branch officer subject to his appointment power. Although there has been
much litigation over whether that removal authority should be plenary,73 the Court repeatedly has
held that the removal power follows the appointment authority.74 In Myers, the Supreme Court
stated that “Article II grants the President the executive power of the Government, the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers – a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take

70

Id.

71

Pub. L. No. 93-236.

72

Pub. L. No. 93-236 § 201(d).

73

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (questioning the adequacy of the President’s
authority over the independent counsel); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (questioning the
adequacy of the President’s removal authority over the Comptroller General).
74

Morrison, 487 U.S. 654; Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714; Weiner v. U.S., 357 U.S. 349 (1985);
Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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care that the laws be faithfully executed.”75 The President must be able to remove a superior
officer “on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not
been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised.”76 Presidents cannot superintend
administration of the laws effectively if they cannot, as a last resort, threaten to discharge
officials, at least if the officers are neglectful of their duties. Again, in Morrison v. Olson, the
Court stressed the importance of the removal provision in permitting the President “sufficient
control over the independent counsel to ensure that the president be able to perform his
constitutionally assigned duties.”77 Although the Court concluded in the independent counsel
case that the removal authority need not be plenary, some form of removal authority was
constitutionally required and, together with other control mechanisms, must ensure that the
President retain sufficient control to exercise his constitutionally assigned duties.
The Free Enterprise Fund decision reinforces the focus on hierarchical authority flowing
from Article II: the “executive power included a power to oversee executive officials through
removal.”78 To the Court, exercise of close removal authority was critical to ensuring
presidential supervision under Article II. Otherwise, the President’s “ability to execute the laws
– by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct – is impaired.”79 The fact that
neither the President nor the SEC could remove members of the PCAOB at will, while members
of the SEC were themselves protected from at will dismissal, was determinative. The Court
concluded that, without sufficient removal authority, “the President could not be held fully
75

Id. at 163.

76

Id. at 135.

77

487 U.S. 654, 658.

78

130 S. Ct. at 3151-52.

79

Id. at 3154.
-17-

accountable for discharging his own responsibilities.”80
Congressional delegations to private parties may deprive presidents of the removal
power. If Congress lodges the power to set standards in a private group, for example, the
President cannot remove members of that group from office.81 Congressional delegation to a
private accounting group such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) to set standards binding on the public would be problematic. The private group could
formulate binding standards, yet the members could not be removed even if the President
disagreed with the standards selected. Moreover, under the global warming bill, the President
could not remove members of the National Academy of Science even if he believed they
engaged in misconduct. Similarly, if Congress designates an insurance company to resolve
Medicare claims, the President would not be able to remove the insurance company if he
determined that the company’s handling of claims was wasteful or inefficent. Private parties
largely are “immune from Presidential oversight, even as they exercise[] power in the people’s
name.”82 As the Court summarized in Free Exercise Fund, “[t]he diffusion of power carries with
it a diffusion of accountability.”83
On occasion, Congress may permit the President to remove a private individual from a
multi-member commission as in the prior United States Railway Association example. But, the
vast majority of such delegations seemingly confound the Free Enterprise Fund imperative that
the President wield sufficiently direct removal authority over all entities exercising federal law.
80
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Of course, the President may wield substantial control even aside from the appointment
and removal authorities. Justice Breyer in dissent addressed the controls that can stem from
funding, rulemaking, ex ante or ex post review of policies, and other mechanisms.84 To the
dissent, the question was whether, taken as a whole, the President exerted enough influence to
assure that the essential attributes of the executive power remained vested in the executive.85
But, to the majority, the removal authority was talismanic – in the absence of such formal
linkage, the President could not be assured effective oversight.
More problematically, a congressional threat to withdraw delegation from a particular
person or entity may be tantamount to congressional exercise of a removal authority. The
officeholder would look only to Congress for direction. The Supreme Court categorically has
determined that Congress itself can play no role in the removal of individuals exercising
significant authority under the laws of the United States.86 A congressional threat to withdraw
authority from a private entity like the AICPA would be tantamount to a removal from office.87
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowsher v. Synar88 is illustrative. In invalidating the
Comptroller General’s role under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,89 the Court focused on the
83
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critical importance of the removal authority. Although the President appoints the Comptroller
General to a fifteen-year term of office, Congress made the Comptroller General removable at
the initiative of Congress for any one of several causes. The Court held that “Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws.”90 The
Court explained that “once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation
ends.”91 Otherwise, Congress would both be able to exercise a de facto appointment and
removal authority, permitting it to influence the exercise of delegated authority. Indeed, in
Myers the Court invalidated Congress’s participation in removal of the postmaster.92
Viewed with an Article II lens, congressional determinations to delegate significant
authority outside the President’s control are suspect. The President’s Article II powers of
appointment and removal are designed not merely to augment executive power, but to protect
individual liberty. To ensure that public power is exercised in a responsible way, the President
should stand formally accountable for the exercise of authority delegated by Congress.
Congressional delegations to trade groups and others can rob the President of his power to
coordinate law implementation efforts and, at the same time, permit Congress too much
influence in the execution of law.
The question remains where to draw the line between impermissible and valid exercises
of authority by private parties. Eliciting advice from private parties does not violate Article II,
but directing private parties to set trade policy would contravene presidential power. The
analysis in Free Enterprise Fund does not illuminate how to set the constitutional test. The
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rulemaking, inspection and enforcement duties of the PCAOB fell on the wrong side of the line
because all parties recognized that, in the aggregate, the PCAOB exercised significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States and could only be appointed and removed in
conformance with Article II. Although I have argued elsewhere that the doctrinal test for
delegation to private parties should focus on whether the private party’s acts bind other private
parties backed by the coercive power of the government,93 the key here is that the Supreme
Court’s recent decision makes it far more likely that congressional delegations of authority to
private parties will elicit closer scrutiny by the Supreme Court should such challenges arise in
the future. Free Enterprise Fund may well have sounded the death knell for delegations of
significant authority to private parties.
Indeed, the majority in Free Enterprise Fund might have bolstered its reasoning by
pointing to the dearth of government-wide regulations applicable to the PCAOB. Congress not
only declared that the PCAOB should not considered an “agency” but, unlike almost all other
governmental entities, it specifically exempted the PCAOB from FOIA.94 Thus, in comparison
to other agencies, fewer government-wide controls constrained the conduct of the entity’s work.
As a consequence, the argument for enhanced centralized control of the type advocated by the
majority is more compelling. In fashioning the PCAOB more like a private entity, Congress
inadvertently bolstered the case for greater presidential control.
Consider as well the self-regulatory model that Congress rejected in creating the PCAOB.
Prior to enactment of the PCAOB, the SEC in effect delegated standard setting to the AICPA.95
93
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After Free Enterprise Fund, such delegations to private entities are suspect – the President
would not be able to oversee development of such standards through the threat of exercising the
removal authority.96 The President must be permitted the discretion to accept, reject, or modify
the standards selected by private entities.
Similarly, the Free Enterprise Fund case calls into question other congressional
delegations to private parties. Congress has authorized self-regulatory organizations such as the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) to investigate and prosecute violations of
federal law.97 Firms wishing to trade have no choice but to join a self-regulatory organization.98
Firms and individuals disciplined, whether through fines or withdrawal of trading privileges,
have a right of appeal to the SEC, but the SEC cannot add any findings to the record.99 There is
some disagreement as to whether the SEC’s standard of review of FINRA’s findings is de
novo.100 Does FINRA in investigating and then adjudicating violations of federal law exercise

comparable authority to the AICPA through the middle of the twentieth century. Nagy, supra.
Since 1973, the SEC recognized the Financial Accounting Standards Board as the official entity
setting standards for public company accounting. Communication Statement of Policy
Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities
Act Release 8221; Exchange Act Release No. 477743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003);
Accounting Series Release NO. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (1973). Note that if Congress merely
adopted preexisting AICPA standards, no constitutional problem would arise.
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significant authority pursuant to the statutes authorizing the self-regulatory mechanism?101 After
Free Enterprise Fund, such delegations may be permissible only if the government can exercise
exacting review before exchange determinations become final.102
Free Enterprise Fund teaches that delegation outside the federal government may
undermine the President’s Article II obligation to superintend law enforcement by robbing him
of his powers to appoint and remove from office those exercising significant authority under the
laws of the United States. How one defines the quantum of authority that only can be exercised
subject to presidential direction becomes pivotal. Although the Court has yet to tackle that
challenge, it is likely that private entities such as the American Bar Association can evaluate
nominees for office103 without transgressing the line, but that permitting private entities to
resolve federal claims without exacting review by a governmental agency would contravene the
animating spirit of Free Enterprise Fund.
II. Delegations to State Entities
Congress long has delegated to state as well as private entities. Congress has approved
state compacts to address issues of federal interest and specified goals to be accomplished.
Congress has also encouraged states to take responsibility to enforce federal standards such as

Cir. 1982) (utilizing preponderance of the evidence standard). See also MBH Commodity
Advisors v. CFTC, 250 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that each agency may construe
statutory provision providing for review of sro’s findings differently, depending on mission of
agency).
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under the EPA.104 Moreover, Congress has authorized state officials to enforce a wide range of
federal laws, most notoriously, under the Fugitive Slave and Volstead Acts.105 Congress has also
incorporated state law as federal policy as under the Federal Tort Claims Act,106 which signifies
that federal rules of decision automatically shift with changes in state law. Finally, Congress
has delegated specific enforcement tasks to state entities as in the NAIC example.
Much of the analysis in Free Enterprise Fund logically should apply to the above
contexts in which Congress delegates authority to state entities. Two key components of
presidential control are absent. The President likely neither appoints nor removes the state entity
that is implementing or enforcing federal law. In the health care reform statute, the President
does not appoint state insurance commissioners, nor can he remove them from the NAIC. In
addition, the President does not enjoy the power unilaterally to withdraw the delegation from the
NAIC. Congress therefore may leave execution of federal law outside the President’s control by
dint of delegation to state entities. Lines of accountability unquestionably can become muddled,
as responsibility for the ultimate policy pursued is shared among Congress, which consented to
the compact, the individual states that are in the compact, and the state officials who are acting to
implement the policy selected.107
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Nonetheless, I argue that delegations to state entities fundamentally differ from those to
private entities for three principal reasons. First, the Constitution anticipates congressional
sharing of power with state far more than private entities. Second, state officials are more
accountable to the electorate – whether directly or indirectly – than are private entities. Third,
there is far less danger of congressional aggrandizement in the context of delegation to state
entities.
Delegations to state entities, however, should not be immune from Article II analysis of
the type articulated in the Free Enterprise Fund decision. In the final section, I examine two
contexts in which delegations to state entities raise distinctive constitutional problems: first,
when the delegation impinges on a presidential power separate from the “take care” authority,
such as in foreign relations; and second, when Congress delegates to favored states the power to
impose costs on others. I tentatively conclude that judicial review is relatively cost free in the
first setting and that limits on delegation accordingly should be enforced, but that judicial review
is not worth the costs in the second. Thus, although a particular delegation to a state entity might
violate the Constitution, the Free Enterprise Fund analysis should not apply as strictly as in the
private delegate context. As a consequence, the delegation to the NAIC likely comports with the
constitutional structure.
A. The Case for Upholding Delegation to State Entities.
As with delegations generally, Congress may have a myriad reasons to recruit state
entities to help implement federal law. Congress, for example, may wish to elicit the expertise of
officials in state government. The NAIC example illustrates this rationale – state insurance
commissioners presumably have greater familiarity and experience with medical loss ratios than
does HHS. Similarly, delegations to states to fashion rules to implement federal mandates under
-25-

the EPA reflect efforts to enlist the help of officials with more immediate knowledge of the
conditions affecting each respective state.108
Delegations to state entities also can ensure that those closest to the dispute have a more
direct say in governance. Cases involving boundary disputes among the states provide a clear
example, as do the compacts among states operating port authorities or other transportation hubs.
States may find congressional delegation more palatable when they can participate in shaping the
rules that affect them so directly. Similarly, in the Free Enterprise Fund109 case, Justice Breyer
in dissent cited the delegation to the Delta Regional Authority.110 By dint of that delegation,
states living in that region make the development decisions critical to future economic growth
within their jurisdictions.
Some delegations to state entities facilitate efficient implementation of the laws. State
officials should be able to detect some federal law violations with less expense than federal
enforcement officials. State officials in investigating state crimes may well learn of conduct that
gives rise to federal law violations. And, by predicating the Federal Tort Claims Act on state
law, Congress need not fashion independent standards of care and rules of recovery. State
legislatures and courts have been setting standards of care for generations.
Finally, some congressional delegations to state entities presumably stem from
congressional reluctance to discharge the responsibilities itself. Law enforcement under the
Fugitive Slave Act provides one example, as may congressional delegation of the power to run
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DC area airports or to determine where low level radioactive waste should be stored.111 As with
delegations more generally, Congress may wish to duck responsibility for tough political
choices. In all, Congress has many understandable reasons for delegating authority to state
entities and officials.
1. The Constitutional Plan
To some degree the constitutional system of federalism contemplates such congressional
sharing of power with state entities. Article I provides that Congress can consent to state
decisions to levy “duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, [or] enter into
an[] agreement with another state or with a foreign power.”112 The Compact Clause has been
utilized frequently, and Congress long has delegated to groups of states the power to regulate
over subjects such as transportation,113 energy,114 and tax matters.115 The resulting rules of the
compacts are to be treated as federal law,116 even if the interstate commissions are not considered
federal agencies.117 The fact that the Founders authorized Congress to consent to state compacts
whose authority could reach issues of national or regional import strongly calls into question the
view that congressional delegation of authority to state entities should be categorically
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prohibited.118
Moreover, Congress since the Founding has recruited state officials to help enforce
federal laws. Congress has authorized state officials to arrest and punish individuals for
violation of federal laws.119 As the Supreme Court summarized in United States v. Jones,120
“from the time of its establishment [the federal] government has been in the habit of using, with
the consent of the States, their officers, tribunals, and institutions as agents.”121 The Court noted
that “their use has not been deemed violative of any principle or in any manner derogating from
the sovereign authority of the federal government.”122 Thus, the Constitution contemplates far
more exercise of executive authority by state than by private entities.123
To be sure, the Supreme Court has counseled that Congress cannot compel state entities
to enforce or implement federal law. For example, in New York v. United States124 the state
challenged Congress’ requirement under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act125 that
states take ownership of all internally generated waste upon the request of the waste’s generator.
This regulation arose out of Congress’s effort to provide an incentive to ensure sufficient
disposal sites for low level radioactive waste. The Court summarized that “Congress may not
118
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simply commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program.”126 Furthermore, “[w]e have always understood that
even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit
those acts.”127
The Court justified its conclusions in part on the ground that, “where the Federal
Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished.”128 State officials might bear the political ill will from following Congress’s policy
even though it was Congress that devised the law. The Court elaborated upon this rationale in
Printz v. United States.129 There, the question for resolution concerned whether Congress could
force state officials to conduct background checks on those seeking to buy handguns. The Court
stressed that, to individuals purchasing handguns, the regulations would appear to come from the
state officials implementing the congressional plan as opposed to Congress.130 As a result, the
goal of accountability was undermined.
The Court’s commandeering doctrine, however, permits states and state officials
voluntarily to implement federal law. When state officials decide on their own to conduct
background checks or to take title to waste sites, they remain accountable for their acts within
our federalist scheme. Even if Congress has set the policy framework, state implementation
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efforts, as long as voluntary, do not obfuscate lines of authority.
State exercise of delegated federal authority undoubtedly strains the structure of our
constitutional system as conventionally understood. Indeed, Justice Scalia recognized that cost
in Printz, noting that widespread delegations by Congress to state officials would permit such
officials “to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed
meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove).”131 He
continued more forcefully that the unified executive branch enforcement “would be shattered and
the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively
without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officials to execute its laws.”132
Yet, the impact on Article II should be the same whether state officials implement federal
law on command or license from Congress – the President’s appointment and removal powers
would be circumvented in either case. Justice Scalia noted the problem and could only offer that
“the condition of voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use
this device as a means of reducing the power of the Presidency.”133 Delegation to state entities
can be reconciled only by dint of the overriding role of states in the plan of convention. The
Founders anticipated that state entities could play a meaningful role in execution of federal law.
Delegation to state entities may be upheld even where they would be invalidated if directed
toward private entities.
2. Political Accountability
In contrast to private entities, state officials are politically accountable. They remain
131
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subject to the checks and balances in the respective states. State officials can be held to account
by the electorate, or at least by their superiors within the state government. Should state
insurance commissioners adopt medical loss ratio standards that are unreasonable, they can be
chastened by state chief executives, and if the sheriffs harass citizens over gun registration, they
may see repercussions at the ballot box. Particularly if state officials’ exercise of delegated
authority focuses on citizens within their states, political checks within those states seem
adequate to constrain their authority. Moreover, under Article VI of the Constitution, state
legislators – unlike private parties – must take an oath of office to support the Constitution.
Consider the delegation to the Delta Regional Authority134 cited by Justice Breyer in
dissent.135 The Authority, which is funded equally by the Federal Government and the states, is
composed of a federal member and the Governor (or a designee of the Governor) of each State in
the region that elects to participate in the Authority.”136 The Authority approves project and
grant proposals “for the economic development of the region.”137 Although the Authority
plainly exercises significant authority in approving projects for economic development of the
region, political accountability is not lost. Participating Governors can tout accomplishments of
the Authority and burnish their records, and failures to husband resources wisely may well
impair chances at the next election. The “public” nature of the exercise of authority provides
some support for implementation of federal tasks by state entities.
3. Potential for Congressional Aggrandizement
There is less danger of congressional aggrandizement when Congress delegates to states
134
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as opposed to private entities. A delegation to a state is much less in the nature of an
appointment – state officials are less likely to feel beholden to Congress than would private
individuals similarly selected. State officials unlikely stand to gain salary or status from
exercising delegated responsibilities. They seldom would endeavor to placate congressional
views in order to retain their jobs – after all, they owe their authority principally to the state, not
the federal government. The Supreme Court has weighed the potential for aggrandizement
heavily in resolving separation of powers disputes.
In contrast, consider congressional delegation to an insurance company that Congress has
designated to handle Medicaid claims. The insurance company recognizes that, should its claim
resolution displease Congress – whether for reasons of inefficiency or error rates – Congress may
well withdraw the delegation. The insurance company might be dependent on congressional
funding for its corporate livelihood. Indeed, self-regulatory organizations recognize that
Congress may impose greater centralized control over the private sector should it be displeased
with the lack of fervor of its regulatory initiatives as happened with the AICPA.138 In contrast,
congressional delegation to state entities carries with it much less risk of continuing oversight or
aggrandizement.
Indeed, one of the most critical protections against undue delegation to administrative
agencies by Congress in general is that Congress must be willing to give up the reins of power.
137

Id. at (d).

138

A similar example is the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
formed in the mid-1980s by industry members trading in swaps and derivatives. See Sean M.
Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, 6 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 211, 234-238 (2001). The ISDA
lobbied to keep the industry self-regulated. Id. at 245-47. However, presumably because of the
role that swaps played in the market blow up and collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG in 2008,
swaps are now regulated by the SEC and CFTC under the Dodd-Frank Act. Pub. L. No. 111-32-

Congressional delegation, in other words, comes with a price – the loss of control over the shape
of the final policy implemented. That check on congressional delegations, while absent for many
delegations to private entities, exists when Congress delegates to state entities
The constitutional recognition for federalism, the comparable accountability of state as
opposed to private officials, and the limited potential for aggrandizement combine to strengthen
the case for permitting Congress to delegate particular functions to state entities. State officials
can enforce federal law, as with the Brady Bill, without violating the constitutional structure.
Similarly, they can in effect make federal law as part of a compact consistent with Article II.
Our system of federalism presupposes some limitation on presidential control over authority
delegated from Congress to state entities.
B. Limitations on Delegation to State Entities
At the same time, delegations to state entities should not be immune from separation of
powers scrutiny. Without teasing out an elaborate theory, let me suggest two contexts in which
Article II concerns arguably trump those of federalism: first, when Congress delegates authority
that diminishes another of the President’s authorities explicit or implied under Article II, such as
the foreign affairs power; second, and more tentatively, when state entities’ exercise of authority
permits one block of states to foist costs on states disfavored by the congressional majority.
1. Independent Article II Powers
Congressional delegation to state entities may, at times, rob the President of an Article II
power other than law enforcement. Although the constitutional design and history suggest that
the President must share some enforcement authority with state entities and officials, the
President should not necessarily brook congressional delegation of other of his constitutionally

203, §§ 701-74, 124 Stat. 1367, 1641-802 (2010).
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grounded powers. For instance, congressional delegation to the NAIC of the power to appoint
the head of Medicare would plainly contravene the Appointment power in Article II. Similarly,
congressional delegation to a state entity of the power to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal officer in each of the executive Departments”139 would be invalid.
Moreover, consider a hypothetical congressional delegation to a state compact
comprising the border states of the authority to enter into trade agreements with Latin America.
Tariff and trade policy might thereby be executed outside the watch of the President. A few
states together, upon delegation from Congress, would have the power to bind the entire country
in setting relations abroad. Needless to say, the interests of respective states in terms of
international relations vary. Indeed, Congress approved a provision in the Great Lakes Basin
Compact establishing that “the Province of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or either of
them, may become states party to this compact by taking such action as their laws and the laws
of the Government of Canada may prescribe for adherence thereto.”140 Congress empowered the
compact to pursue measures with a palpable impact on foreign affairs.
The Constitution recognizes the potential conflict, but only in part. Article I itself forbids
states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant letters of Marque and
Reprisal.”141 That prohibition suggests a constitutional awareness that Article II at times trumps
federalism. But, Article I does not limit congressionally approved compacts that do not fall
within the category of “Treaty, Alliance or Confederation,” even those with foreign states.142
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The line between “Treaty, Alliance or Confederation” and compacts with foreign states is not
self-evident, and the Supreme Court has stated that any such distinction in the minds of the
Framers has been lost to history.143 Article II must be accommodated with Article I in some
fashion.
Although a congressional stamp of approval can authorize states to execute the law,
Congress cannot resort to delegation to state entities to strip the President of his role in foreign
affairs.144 The Constitution may not sort out the overlap between federalism and separation of
powers concerns, but it plants the seeds for an accommodation.
Indeed, comparable concerns have led the Supreme Court to strike down state laws that
have interfered with the United States’ foreign policy, even absent a delegation from Congress.
In Zschernig v. Miller,145 for example, Oregon law had prohibited any non-U.S. citizen from
inheriting property if his or her home nation denied U.S. citizens that right. After losing in
Oregon’s courts, an East German citizen successfully sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court,
which reversed the Oregon decision on the ground that the state statute impermissibly intruded
into the President’s foreign affairs power. For another example, Massachusetts in 1996
established a restrictive purchasing list targeting companies doing business with Burma
(Myanmar) to protest the dictatorship’s policies. That action placed the United States in the
awkward position of defending the Massachusetts approach before the World Trade
Organization while attempting behind the scenes to pressure Massachusetts to change the law.
143
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Firms doing business in Burma challenged the law, and the courts invalidated the measure. In
particular, the Supreme Court in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council146 stressed that
Massachusetts’ action interfered with subsequent congressional delegation of authority to the
President to impose sanctions on Burma.
Although Congress in the above examples had not sanctioned the state interference in
foreign affairs, from a presidential perspective, the question of congressional interference is
immaterial. In either scenario state entities’ conduct undermines the President’s constitutionally
grounded authority over foreign affairs. Perhaps congressional authorization can alter the
boundaries in which states are free to act, but congressional delegation can no more vest in states
the power to manage aspects of foreign relations than it can authorize states to enter into treaties.
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes v. Jennison.147 The Supreme Court
confronted the question whether Vermont could agree with Canadian authorities to extradite
fugitives in the absence of congressional sanction. A majority of the eight Justices participating
evidently concurred in Chief Justice Taney’s reasoning that the extradition agreement was
illegal, but could be rectified by congressional consent.148 The Court ignored the potential
separation of powers ramifications of Vermont’s unilateral determination to enter into an
extradition agreement with a sovereign nation. In light of the President’s constitutionally
grounded powers over foreign relations – the power to propose treaties, appoint ambassadors,
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and be commander-in-chief of the armed forces – the Holmes v. Jennison Court should have
struck down Vermont’s arrangement on Article II grounds as well. Congress cannot enlist
particular states to forge foreign policy. As Zschernig and Crosby demonstrate in the related
context sketched above, there will be line drawing issues, but state delegations should be
judicially policed to ensure that the delegations do not permit intrusion into the President’s
powers other than in law enforcement. The historic understanding of shared power between
states and the federal government does not extend that far. Free Enterprise Fund suggests that
delegation to state entities should be scrutinized at least to determine whether the President
exercises sufficient control over foreign affairs.
2. Delegations Permitting Discrimination Against Nonparticipating States
Arguably, Congress should also be limited in delegating to state entities when the
delegation permits states to infringe the interests of states that have been excluded from the
delegation.149 Although delegations to a wide swath of state officials as in the NAIC example
would not be problematic, delegations to a compact of states could visit harm on
nonparticipating states. As a theoretical matter, the President’s Article II powers are designed in
part to ensure accountability for a national constituency. As the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
framed it, the “Constitution requires that a president chosen by the entire Nation oversee
execution of the laws.”150 If congressional delegations to state entities result in injury to
nonparticipating states, then bypassing the President causes an independent harm in precluding
the check of presidential oversight – oversight from the only politically elected official beholden
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to a national constituency.151 As Professor Steven Calabresi expresses the presidential advantage
in a slightly different context, “the only official with any incentive under our present electoral
structure to stop this [effort to impose costs on others] is the President who is (along with the
Vice President) our only nationally elected official.”152 Similar sentiments support presidential
line item vetoes – only the President arguably has the national perspective to stop earmarks that
redound to the benefit only of particular sectors of the country.153
The Supreme Court on occasion has stated that the congressional consent requirement in
the Compact Clause was designed in part to avoid states shifting costs or harms to
nonparticipating ones. Compacts must be submitted for congressional approval in part to guard
against, in Justice White’s words in United States Steel v. Multistate Tax Commission,
“encroachments upon non-compact States.”154 Consider congressional delegation to a compact
of states to regulate production of coal in the Northeastern states. In making its determination,
the compact might be tempted to shift costs of externalities such as pollution to states in the
Midwest.155 Similarly, states may urge Congress to set up conditional funding programs that
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they know other states cannot take advantage of.156 In the United States Steel v. Multistate Tax
Commission case, itself, plaintiffs challenging the compact argued that the states participating in
the compact might agree to particular tax formulas to draw businesses from nonparticipating
states.157
The continuing litigation over disposal of low level radioactive waste manifests the risk
of state v. state friction. Congress authorized compacts to encourage states to determine among
themselves which states would create and maintain waste sites, and how other members of the
compact would furnish sufficient incentives to the state in which the site is located. The states
involved in the compact have little interest in permitting waste generated outside the compact to
be stored in their sites.158
At times, consumer interests within the states may restrain state efforts to impose costs on
businesses outside the state because of the concern for price increases. The compact, however,
may override such objections, particularly if the states can ensure that much of the costs of any
development flow downstream.
In such cases, the congressional consent requirement might be insufficient to prevent
encroachment on interests of states outside the compact. Although the prospect of a presidential
veto of the law setting up the compact exists, establishment of a compact itself would rarely
reveal any intent to harm nonparticipating states. Congress could seize upon the delegation to
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accomplish a goal that it could not accomplish directly – subordination of a disfavored state or
group of states, whether in the context of pollution or energy.159 Indeed, there is some evidence
that participating states have utilized compacts to shift costs to those states not included,160
although empirical evidence as to the incidence of cost shifting is extremely limited.
To be sure, states may always lose in Congress. On some issues, agrarian states may win,
on others, it may be coal producing states, and for still others, it may be states in which federal
military bases are located. The genius of the Virginia Plan was to minimize the potential that
small states would lose out consistently in the legislative process. Given the shifting coalitions, a
state with an adverse interest today might become an ally tomorrow, and that possibility restrains
larger states from encroaching too much on smaller or disfavored states’ interests.
The need to present each proposed bill to the President also works to minimize the
potential for states to exact too much benefit at the expense of others in the system. The threat of
a veto can squelch any such power play.
In the congressional delegation context, however, there is no presentment to the
President. Indeed, there often is no supervision by the President. State compacts may well
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decide to visit the burdens of regulation on nonparticipating states. Congressional delegation
reallocates the burden of overcoming inertia – a new majority would be needed to withdraw the
delegation to the states or to overturn the policymaking by the compact. In essence, Congress
might be tempted to delegate to particular states for many of the same reasons it delegates to
administrative agencies – to accomplish an objective that it could not attain directly through
legislation.161
Contrast the delegation context to Congress’s role in a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. There, as well, Congress has the opportunity to ratify one state’s efforts to impose
costs on businesses or citizens living outside its borders.162 As the Court summarized in
Associated Industries v. Lohman163 the Dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits economic
protectionism . . . regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors.”164 The prospect of a presidential veto exists to temper any
inclinations by members of Congress to sustain a discriminatory measure.165 Although a
congressional override of a veto can enact a discriminatory measure into law,166 the requirement
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of presentment mutes that concern. Moreover, it is doubtful that a supermajority in Congress
would wish to sanction burdens on commerce against a minority of states given the need for
continued coalition building in Congress.
Yet, one critical distinction exists – in the Dormant Commerce clause context, Congress
directly assesses the benefits and drawbacks of the state law that allegedly burdens out of state
interests. In contrast, the potential burden or encroachment on disfavored states arises at a
different stage in the delegation context – only after Congress and the President have agreed to
the delegation. The state compact’s action need not be channeled through Congress or the
President before becoming law. As with other delegations of administrative authority, there are
political checks before the delegation, but not afterwards. Just as legislation is subject to greater
formal political checks than authority delegated to administrative agencies, so the protections for
states are greater for legislation than for authority delegated to other states.
The theoretical risk of encroachment among the states, however, does not suggest an
easily enforceable line to draw.167 Tests would have to be forged, as under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, to determine when states’ exercise of delegated authority, particularly
through compacts, results in an unacceptable harm to an unrepresented state. The contours of
this newly devised subpart of the Nondelegation Doctrine would be difficult to derive. Courts
presumably would consider whether to focus principally on the intent underlying the challenged
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measure or, rather, its results, whether a new hydroelectric plant or standard setting for coal
production. One of the problems of any test is that nonparticipating states always are injured if
the participating states help themselves financially through the compact and, as a consequence,
make their venues more attractive for business. Courts would have to determine which measures
aimed at advancing the economic wealth of participating states impermissibly target
nonparticipating states and which reflect run of the mill efforts aimed toward economic
development of the region.
More problematically, there is no remedy to apply unless courts step into the shoes of the
President to determine if the President would have approved the measure had he been afforded
the opportunity to review the policy set by the compact. In essence, courts would have to
secondguess presidential policy in determining which state measures – pursuant to
congressionally delegated authority – unconstitutionally burden interests of other states.
But that very secondguessing of presidential policy would itself be problematic, for the
President would have no direct way to review the judicial decision to determine whether to
permit the delegation to stand. In the Dormant Commerce Clause setting, by contrast, Congress
can consent to state initiatives that burden interstate commerce. In the delegation context,
however, the President would not have final say.
Judicial enforcement itself, therefore, would intrude into Article II prerogatives. Judges
cannot effectively evaluate policy implemented by state entities pursuant to congressional
delegations. In short, courts can review states’ exercise of congressionally delegated authority to
determine if the delegate’s action is ultra vires, but courts cannot realistically step into the shoes
of the President and invalidate exercises of authority that impose costs on other states.
Finally, the difficulty of reviewing the exercise of authority delegated to compacts
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reinforces the importance of the ex ante decision to approve the initial delegation or formation of
a compact. Congress and the President should be aware of the potential that states may exercise
delegated authority in a way that disadvantages other states’ interests. Moreover, that possibility
may well prove reason for courts to construe the terms of congressional delegations to states
narrowly.168 Courts should be stinting when reviewing challenges to authority exercised by
congressionally approved compacts given that the policy formulated after such delegations
evades presidential superintendence, which was designed to ensure that states do not take
advantage of others. Such strict construction reflects an accommodation between the federalism
and Article II principles underlying our Constitution.
CONCLUSION
To date, discussion of Free Enterprise Fund has focused on its potential impact to
rigidify structures of administrative agencies. If the President must supervise administrative
officials through the removal authority, then Congress cannot innovate as much in creating
administrative entities that are outside the political influence of the President. Justice Breyer’s
dissent vividly illustrates the ramifications of the decision if applied outside the narrow setting of
the PCAOB.
The broader implications of the decision, however, ultimately may rest with constricted
opportunities for Congress to delegate authority to state and private entities. Congress typically
leaves the President with no removal authority when delegating outside the federal government.
The logic of Free Enterprise Fund strongly suggests that Congress may not, consistent with
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Article II, delegate significant authority to private and state entities. Although the decision does
not elaborate on what constitutes “significant authority,” it imperils a wide range of structures
permitting private and state entities to participate in shaping federal law, including the Federal
Open Market Committee, self-regulated organizations that have received Congress’s imprimatur,
and congressionally approved state compacts.
Free Enterprise Fund should prompt reconsideration of authority delegated by Congress
to private entities. Executive branch oversight not only comports with Article II, but can protect
private parties from overreaching. Preventing Congress from delegating to private parties
ensures that public authority will be implemented in a way that can be traced to the President. In
particular, Congress after Free Enterprise Fund may not be able to delegate decisionmaking
authority to groups such as the NAS or enforcement authority to self-regulatory organizations
unless there is sufficiently stringent oversight by Article II entities.
In contrast to private actors, however, state actors in large part are politically accountable,
and there is little risk of congressional aggrandizement from delegation to state entities. State
officials should be able to enforce federal law, Congress should be able to incorporate state law
by reference, and state compacts should be able to fashion federal policy. Courts should
intervene only when compacts or other state entities infringe upon a distinct presidential power
under Article II, such as the power to supervise foreign affairs. Thus, while delegations to
private individuals and entities should be curtailed in light of the lack of presidential oversight,
Free Enterprise Fund should leave untouched most delegations to state entities: our federalist
structure presupposes a limitation on the President’s Article II responsibility to superintend
enforcement of delegated authority.
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